From 26-29 March 2010, an IPCS-led delegation held meetings at think tanks in Beijing which included the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, China Institute of International Studies and China Foundation for International & Strategic Studies. These were in addition to a two-day conference held with the Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament on 27-28 March which was titled “Developing a More Propitious Framework for China-India Cooperation.”

SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS

26 March 2010
0900 - 1200 hrs: China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
1400 - 1630 hrs: China Institute of International Studies

27 - 28 March 2010
0900-1700 hrs: Conference on “Developing a More Propitious Framework for China-India Cooperation”

29 March 2010
1430 - 1630 hrs: China Foundation for International & Strategic Studies.

The Indian participants at these meetings were:

1. Dipankar Banerjee, Director, IPCS
2. Srikanth Kondapalli, Professor, Chinese Studies, JNU
3. Swaran Singh, Professor, Diplomacy and Disarmament, JNU
4. Arun Sahgal, Consultant, IPCS
5. KK Agnihotri, Research Fellow, National Maritime Foundation
6. Rukmani Gupta, Research Fellow, IPCS

CHINA INSTITUTES OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (CICIR)

China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) is a
comprehensive research institution for international studies supported by the Chinese Government. In compliance with the directive of the State Council to set up a series of new institutions for international studies, its predecessor, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations was formed in 1980. In 2003, the Institute was renamed and upgraded to China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). CICIR consists of 11 institutes, 2 research divisions under direct supervision of CICIR leaders, 8 research centres and several administrative departments, e.g. the President’s Office. CICIR has now a staff of 380, including researchers, administrative and logistic personnel, among whom 150 are research professors or associate research professors.

The Chinese participants at the meeting included:

1. Cui Liru, Director and Head, CICIR
2. Hu Shisheng, Deputy Director, Institute of South and Southeast Asian Studies
3. Du Bing, Assistant Professor, Institute of South and Southeast Asian Studies
4. Lou Chunhao, Assistant Research Professor, Institute of South and Southeast Asian Studies
6. Li Li, Associate Research Fellow, Institute of South and Southeast Asia Studies
7. Feng Zhongping, Director, Institute of European Studies

The meeting began with both sides expressing a commitment to resolve differences between their two countries. The Chinese emphasized the need to look forward to explore possibilities without letting differences in some spheres hamper progress in others. While agreeing with this, the Indian side underlined the need to resolve the border question at an early date.

During the course of the meeting the following issues were discussed:

**AFGHANISTAN**

**Indian participants:**
Since the US President’s first review in March, there are concerns over future US policies. While ground operations and the current surge attempt to isolate the Taliban, there are simultaneous efforts to make a deal with the “moderate” Taliban and include them as stakeholders. What are Chinese perspectives on issues such as a political settlement with the Taliban. Are religious extremism and radicalism concerns for China? How can India and China support a positive outcome in Afghanistan, in an environment wherein they are not the primary players, even tough the US may perhaps be reluctant to accord either country a greater role?

While tribal reconciliation is extremely important, the inclusion of “moderate” Taliban is problematic. Can there exist such a group as “moderate” Taliban, when by definition the Taliban is not moderate? There are other ethnic groups and how are their interests to be safeguarded? Other communities also need to be visible in the political process and given an opportunity to voice their opinions. Thus far the focus has been on the Pashtuns and the Taliban because they are so destructive. Neither China nor India can afford to ignore the threat of Islamic extremism in the region.

There exist some commonalities between India and China on the issue of Afghanistan. Both countries have concerns on the emergence of religious extremism and can be thankful that this has not yet spread to Central Asia. Both countries want an independent region and have a stake in regional
economic and infrastructural development, especially pipelines. Also, both countries are interested in counter-terrorism cooperation and must operationalize this. In case of the ISAF withdrawal, it must be remembered that the neighbourhood will be the biggest loser with extremism spreading around the region.

**Chinese participants:**
It is important for the future settlement in Afghanistan to be comprehensive. The US itself has realized its faulty policies and amended them to broaden operations at many levels including reconstruction and political settlement. The issue of American withdrawal is not unduly significant but may signal a symbolic retreat to pacify domestic public opinion. The US is likely to stay in Afghanistan as long as necessary. While a military solution is important, what is required is a consensus on collective security. The NATO’s own report states that the Taliban cannot be defeated. It is hard to make distinctions—Taliban is Taliban. What is important is to have a partner with decisive power in negotiations. The US should negotiate with someone who can deliver, looking at the whole picture rather than just the Taliban.

There is a need to understand why Afghanistan is important. Although people earlier felt that this was a mess made by the US in which China need not get involved, this thinking is changing. However, the idea that China would send peacekeeping troops to Afghanistan is very premature and highly unlikely.

**PAKISTAN**

**Indian participants:**
India is deeply concerned about internal developments in Pakistan. It seems to be a state that is beginning to fall apart. India does not understand Pakistan’s unease with Indian presence in Afghanistan. Perhaps China could be useful in convincing Pakistan that India has only a benign role there. India and China must work together to alleviate the economic and developmental problems in Afghanistan, which is a SAARC member. Road connectivity between India and Afghanistan is an important issue in this regard and is in fact an Afghan demand. Plans for road connectivity have not been supported by Pakistan. Even on issues concerning Afghanistan where India and China can cooperate, Pakistan continues to be a factor because of its sensitivities.

**Chinese participants:**
On Pakistan, China can play a role but it is not good for China to put pressure on Pakistan. This is because Pakistan has many difficulties to deal with currently and China’s role can only be one in which it can advise as a friend. Pressurizing Pakistan from all sides is not constructive.

There has been some talk of a US-Pakistan Nuclear Deal — could this be because the US wants to check India and give Pakistan some status? While energy is important for Pakistan, what is more important is the strategic balance in South Asia. It needs to maintain confidence vis-à-vis India. China itself does not believe this to be a good development because it has the potential for larger embarrassment for China in the future.
INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS

Indian participants:
Resolving the border issue is important to further improve bilateral ties. There is a need to speed-up the process of settling the border question and enhance border trade. The Special Representatives have been working hard on this and the draft framework was ready in November 2006 but till March 2010 there has been very little progress. Also, border trade has not picked up, despite the opening of a border trade post in Sikkim. What are the reasons for this? Trade used to be seen as the most reliable pillar of bilateral relations but even the overall trade has in the last year seen a sudden drop.

This year marks the 60th anniversary of diplomatic ties between India and China. There is an India Culture Festival being planned in 33 Chinese cities this year and this is evidence of the goodwill on both sides. The 60th year is a milestone in both cultures. The past year revived memories of conflict; however there was constructive movement at the highest levels. General Ge’s visit and the visit of Tibet’s military general to India were both great successes.

The revival of nationalism on both sides is an issue. Despite this, CBMs have been going forward on many issues – the Annual Defence Dialogue is a case in point. In spite of the turbulence in bilateral relations, Premier Wen Jiabao called up Prime Minister Manmohan Singh five times on the phone before the Copenhagen Climate summit. Indian Minister for External Affairs SM Krishna has also stated that there is goodwill on both sides to de-escalate tensions. The key question that remains is how to operationalize cooperation.

China’s investment in infrastructure in South Asia is welcome but there also exists the perception that these facilities could be used for other purposes. Such apprehensions need to be overcome. A good way of doing so would be greater cooperation among Chinese and Indian think-tanks. Transparency is the key to reducing misperceptions because there continue to be some concerns in the realm of security. Some have written in China that India’s relations with Mongolia and Vietnam as well as the Look East Policy is an attempt at the encirclement of China. Greater cooperation in projects in the region would go a long way in reducing misapprehensions. Perhaps India could be involved in Chinese projects such as the Gwadar port and study the possibility of further cooperating in the construction of oil and gas pipelines.

Chinese participants:
Tensions in bilateral ties last year can be attributed to the “media war” that emerged due to the Indian Prime Minister’s and Dalai Lama’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh. By January 2010 there was a consensus in China and India to foster better bilateral ties. Due to domestic pressure on both sides, it is difficult to speed-up this process. In such a situation there is perhaps a need for a creative solution but this in itself can be problematic.

It is the upper level in the political set-up that is the driving force for improved relations and not the lower level. Foreign policy reflects domestic polity and there are many problems in the domestic realm. For China, stability is the number one priority. A sudden resolution of the border issue can destabilize the domestic situation. Therefore, what is essential is to create support for resolution in the future. Cooperation between the two countries can reduce differences in a stable way and therefore, cooperation must be expanded despite differences. In China people increasingly understand the relationship with India and emphasize cooperation. This is especially true for those within the government — they realize the strategic nature of the bilateral relationship. However,
merely a forward-looking and patient attitude is also not enough; some improvement is necessary to let the public understand that the relationship is moving in a positive direction.

In India many have written on threat perceptions vis-à-vis China’s involvement in South Asia. It seems that each country is worried about possible future scenarios that are unlikely. Cooperation in key projects and joint partnerships are required to inculcate trust.

China has good relations with other countries in South Asia. Nepal is important for stability in Tibet because a large volume of China’s trade passes through Nepal; however, Nepal is also seen as a stronghold of exiled Tibetans. China has some sympathy with the Maoist ideology and has encouraged Prachanda to build a more constructive approach towards India and seeks to help him be a good leader. Due to the controversy surrounding the proposed China-Nepal friendship treaty in India, China backed-off from this proposal. Signing a document is not of utmost importance. China also sees Bangladesh as being valuable for regional cooperation.

On the issue of overseas bases that has been highlighted recently, it should be remembered that these have been proposed solely for the convenience offered to anti-piracy operations. One isolated base in any case has little value. On this issue, cooperation with India in the Indian Ocean Region is a good idea.

As far as operationalizing cooperation in the sphere of counter-terrorism is concerned, perhaps the focus should not be on fighting a common enemy; rather it should be on technical cooperation especially in the realm of money laundering and fighting extremism.

**China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)**

China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) is the think tank of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It conducts research and analysis on a wide range of foreign policy issues. The Institute was founded in 1956 under the name of Institute of International Relations, and assumed the present name in December 1986. In 1998, China Centre for International Affairs, formerly a research institution of China’s State Council, was incorporated with CIIS. Qu Xing is the current President of the CIIS.

Research at CIIS is focused primarily on medium and long-term policy issues of strategic importance, particularly those concerning international politics and world economy. It also includes comments and policy recommendations on the world’s major events and hot-spot issues.

The Chinese participants at the meeting included:

1. Rong Ying, Vice President, CIIS
2. Zheng Ruixiang, Senior Research Fellow
3. Chen Yurong, Senior Research Fellow, Director, Centre for SCO Studies and Department of the European-central Asian Studies
4. Li Guofu, Senior Research Fellow, Director of Division for South Asian
During the course of the meeting the following issues were discussed:

INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS

**Chinese participants:**
From the large number of personal interactions and the government functions taking place it is clear that both the emerging economies are investing in the relationship. The international media often gives a comparative analysis of the two countries and there is a tremendous interest in the bilateral relationship. Scholars have an obligation to give answers to the questions raised on the bilateral relationship.

The negative reports in the media began to appear in the later half of 2008. The “media hype” did not represent the real situation. It was not official organs that engaged in negative propaganda. The 60 years of bilateral ties can be divided into two periods – 1950s to end of the last century and the decade of the new century. Through the first period, the relationship saw many ups and downs. This period when India and China co-sponsored “Panchsheel,” can be regarded as the best period in bilateral ties. In the new century there has been no major setback to improving relations and this period has been categorized by positive developments.

There are three “Ts” that shape China-US relations: Taiwan, Tibet and Trade. In the case of China-India too there are three — Territory, Tibet and Trade. These cumulatively form the fourth ‘T’ of Trust. Trade has reduced to US$44 billion last year, which is a sharp drop but this can perhaps be attributed to the global economic crisis. The most difficult problem between the two countries is the border dispute.

China has sent five missions to the Gulf of Aden. Since India is extremely active in the Indian Ocean Region, there is scope for cooperation in the maritime sphere. This could begin in the form of cooperation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. It is regrettable that the positive voices on both sides are too small. The shared commonalities between the two countries must be vocalized so as to generate goodwill among the larger population.

**Indian participants:**
The three “Ts” of the bilateral relationship is certainly a good formulation but individually each of these is not an issue. On the question of “Territory” the 1993 Agreement on Peace and Tranquility has laid the groundwork. The issue of territory must be resolved peacefully and early. When the border issue lingers it hampers trust. Major changes along the borders are not feasible and such a suggestion cannot promote a final resolution but will create new problems. The media on both sides is vying for viewership and in such an atmosphere it is easy to sell stories that are negative. Next steps on the boundary question need to be taken. The aim must be to identify the border without a final settlement. If discernible political moves in this direction are made, they will help improve public opinion.

On “Tibet” India has given all that was asked by China. It recognizes a one-China policy and considers Tibet an integral part of China. The only condition that was not fully met was the demand to hand
over the Dalai Lama. This is not possible because of civilizational factors. The Dalai Lama is a peaceful, spiritual leader recognized the world over and by most Indians, he must be respected. As far as “Trade” is concerned, it has been growing rapidly and has perhaps stalled due to the global economic crisis. There exist imbalances on the issue of trade that need to be better managed.

There exist possibilities for cooperation between India and China especially in the realm of maritime security. In the case of the Malacca Straits, since littoral states do not want any direct involvement from outside, aid can be provided in the form of software instead of hardware.

**AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN**

*Chinese participants:*
The basic question in Afghanistan is how to deal with the issue of people’s livelihood. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has scope for involvement in Afghanistan because the SCO has experience in fighting the three evils of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. However, the SCO is still a new and emerging organization and functions on the principle of consensus, which may not be immediately helpful in the current situation.

On the issue of US and Pakistan, it must be remembered that despite US$7.5 billion in aid, no real trust exists between the two. It is because Pakistan feels that the US prioritizes India the US is now trying to placate Pakistan by encouraging investment in Pakistan and is trying to change the relationship to one of a strategic partner. How does India view these developments?

*Indian participants:*
The US relationships – with Pakistan and India — cannot be linked. It was delinked under the previous administration and will remain separated. Terrorism is a major concern today and India recognizes that it threatens Pakistan more than any other country. India wants the war against terrorism to be won by all. Despite the global economic crisis, the US has continued to provide aid and support to Pakistan. Yet, Pakistan continues to remain suspicious because of past history and is afraid that this might be repeated.

India poses no threat to Pakistan and it is for Islamabad to accept that it is threatened from within. That the military hardware provided by the US to Pakistan will not be restricted to fight terrorism is recognized, but India is willing to understand, up to a point. It is to this end that India did not retaliate despite overwhelming evidence of Pakistani official involvement in the Mumbai attacks.

**EAST ASIA**

*Chinese participants:*
The emerging structure in East Asia gives increasing importance to India. How does India view the future of the East Asian community?

*Indian participants:*
India and China are emerging countries with increasing influence. Lessons from history should not be forgotten, it must be remembered that in Europe prior to the reconciliation between the United Kingdom and France, no peace and stable development was possible. This rivalry led to the
100 years war and then to the two World Wars. Similarly, India and China must resolve their differences if the region is to prosper as a whole. India, China and Japan need to cooperate. Japan is still the number two economy in the world and has expertise in high technology. Therefore, trilateral cooperation is essential between these three countries if Asia as a whole has to prosper.

Many countries in Southeast Asia and East Asia welcome the US as an Asian power. This is a reality that cannot be disregarded. Despite the slight strain in US-Japan relations, Japan recognizes the importance of US presence in the region especially with reference to DPRK.

The idea of an East Asian community or architecture has been put forth by many countries. ASEAN would like an Asian Security architecture within which it has a leading role. Prime Minister Rudd of Australia has proposed an Asia-Pacific Community and Prime Minister Hatoyama of Japan put forth the idea of an East Asian Community. There is no conceptual clarity on the issue. There is no telling how this idea will evolve in the future. India has no official position on this issue, but the Prime Minister has stated that the ASEAN+3+3 is the best framework for regional economic cooperation.

NUCLEAR ISSUES

Chinese participants:
It has been suggested that the Indo-US Nuclear deal has run into some problems. What are India’s views on the upcoming Nuclear Safety and Security Summit?

Indian participants:
The Indo-US Nuclear Deal is well on its way to being fully implemented. There are only some procedural matters regarding the nuclear liability clause that are pending at the domestic political level.

India welcomes the agreement on strategic arms reduction between the US and Russia and supports the New START as a good step forward. India is happy to discuss nuclear issues with Washington and although it is not clear whether India will have visibility at the NPT Review Conference, it is working closely with the US Government on nuclear safety issues. India is concerned about the links between terrorism and nuclear proliferation. If terrorists have access to fissile materials, this will be an issue of major concern to all nations.

CHINA FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL & STRATEGIC STUDIES (CFISS)

The China Foundation for International & Strategic Studies (CFISS), established in 1989, is the only nation-wide foundation in the field of international and strategic studies in China. It is also a non-government, non-profit institution, which aims at serving the interests of national strategic policy-making, improving the quality of academic study in the field of international politics and promoting mutual understanding and strategic reassurance between China and other nations by sponsoring and conducting various academic
activities and training programs.

The Chinese participants at this meeting included:
1. Chen Zhiya, Secretary General, CFISS
2. Sr Col Ouyang Wei, Centre for Defense Mobilization Studies, NDU
3. Col Ding Hao, Department of World Military Studies, Academy of Military Sciences
4. Lu Dehong, Director, Department of Research, CFISS
5. Dai Jian, Associate Researcher, CFISS
6. Fu Xiao, Associate Research Fellow, CFISS

The meeting began with the CFISS providing the Indian delegation with a comprehensive idea of the activities undertaken by its research institutions. The Crisis Reduction Center at CFISS has been undertaking research on crisis management for the last five years and is engaged in scenario building and simulation of cooperative and conflictual scenarios between the US and China. It is also a Centre devoted to Taiwan Straits Study which has been changing its focus from security to political studies given the improved relations between the Mainland and Taiwan. The Strategic and Military Planning Centre focuses on domestic issues including the information revolution. Foreign policy research at CFISS seeks to collaborate with researchers from other institutes. CFISS is currently involved in many dialogue processes: Track II dialogue with the US that focuses on military to military relations and Taiwan; Nuclear dialogue between the US and China which is extremely important because no official dialogue on this issue is in place; Crisis management; Annual dialogue with Japan and South Korea.

During the course of the meeting the following issues were discussed:

**INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS**

**Chinese participants:**
A constructive solution to the border question is required and discussion is also needed on the role China and India can play in the world today. Greater avenues for exchange and dialogue need to be created. It is only through personal experience that inherent prejudices can be removed at the individual level.

There is need for greater professionalism in the economic sphere and the two countries must work on their commonalities. Projects that are focused on counter-terrorism and nuclear issues, especially crisis management on these issues, should be promoted.

**Indian participants:**
After the 1988 visit by Rajiv Gandhi, exchanges between India and China have increased manifold. The two countries now participate in military exercises, there is an Annual Defence Dialogue in place and there is also cooperation on global issues. However, threat perceptions remain and greater exchange is needed to reduce these.

Many commonalities between the two countries have been suggested right from the time of Deng Xiaoping. India has been proposing greater counter-terrorism cooperation for a long time and both countries have been advocating multilateralism since the Bandung conference. It is now time to take concrete steps to operationalize cooperation on these fronts.
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

Chinese participants:
Issues of mutual concern such as the problems with the US’ Af-Pak policy and maintaining stability on the sub-continent should be freely exchanged between India and China. More cooperation between India and China must be undertaken in order to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. It has been suggested by some that stability in Pakistan is essential for stability in Afghanistan, how does India view this? There is talk of US withdrawal and meetings between President Karzai and the Taliban, what are India’s perceptions of these developments?

If the US decides to take military action against terrorists in Pakistan, how would India view this? Is there a mechanism that permits India and Pakistan to freely discuss bilateral issues? How is India facilitating cooperation on terrorism on the ground? Is it an Indian strategy to reduce forces in Kashmir so that Pakistan may be able to deal with problems in its Western region?

Indian participants:
India is seriously concerned with the developments in Af-Pak and the possible fallout of an adversarial situation developing there. In the Indian view, it is not so much Afghanistan but the domestic situation in Pakistan that is alarming.

The rise of radical Islam in the Af-Pak region has repercussions for India and while India cannot resolve the issue for Afghanistan or Pakistan, it does reserve the right to take action if national interests are threatened.

The Taliban leadership is largely believed to be in Pakistan, due to which Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan cannot be disregarded. Pakistan also stands in the way of greater economic development in Afghanistan by not allowing land access between India and Afghanistan. Land routes are extremely important to transport even the most basic goods such as surplus food grains from India, which impacts the life of thousands of Afghans.

Terrorism is the greatest threat in today’s world and is largely being perpetrated by non-state actors, which is cause for concern in both India and Pakistan. It is not in India’s interest to have an unstable Pakistan as a neighbour. US military moves into Pakistan could have serious fallouts and this is not a development that India will look upon favourably. India has extended all possible support to Pakistan to help it deal with the domestic situation. Despite overwhelming evidence of collusion of state actors in the Mumbai attacks, India dealt with the situation peacefully, in a highly restrained and responsible manner.

There are bilateral dialogues at various levels between India and Pakistan. Vibrant Track II dialogues between academics of both countries are also underway.

There is much that China can do to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. With reports of US withdrawal, the SCO could help formulate an alternate plan to stabilize the Af-Pak region. The SCO has experience in counter-terrorism exercises. China itself has much experience dealing with domestic violence as the incidents of violence related to religious extremism within China have risen in the recent past. This experience can be utilized elsewhere.

Both sides agreed that as NGO’s they have much to contribute towards better and more cooperative relations between India and China.
CONFERENCE ON “DEVELOPING A MORE PROPITIOUS FRAMEWORK FOR CHINA-INDIA COOPERATION” 27-28 MARCH 2010

CONFERENCE AGENDA

SESSION I  INDIA-CHINA STRATEGIC RELATIONS – AN OVERVIEW
Speakers:
Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee (Director, IPCS)
Maj Gen Pan Zhenqiang (Deputy Chairman, China Foundation for International Studies)

SESSION II  MAINTAINING PEACE AND STABILITY (ENHANCING MILITARY CBMs) ALONG THE BORDER IN THE EAST AND THE WEST
Speakers:
Sr Col Wang Guifang (Senior Research Fellow, the PLA Academy of Military Science)
Brig Arun Sahgal (Consultant, IPCS)

SESSION III  PROMOTING STRATEGIC STABILITY (CBMS IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD)
Speakers:
Prof Srikanth Kondapalli (Professor, Centre for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University)
Prof Shen Dingli (Director, Centre for American Studies, Fudan University)

SESSION IV  MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL MARITIME COOPERATION
Speakers:
Cdr KK Agnihotri (Research Fellow, National Maritime Foundation)
Prof Xia Liping (Dean, School of International Relations, Tongji University)

SESSION V  ENHANCING ANTI-TERRORISM COOPERATION
Speakers:
Maj Gen Gong Xianfu (Deputy Chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies)
Prof Swaran Singh (Professor, Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University)

SESSION VI  FACILITATING MEDIA AND THINK TANK INTERACTION
Speakers:
Ms Rukmani Gupta (Research Fellow, IPCS)
Prof Wang Fan (Director, Institute of International Relations, China Foreign Affairs University)
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

The IPCS is dedicated to independent, non-partisan research and analysis. Its vision is to promote peace, security and development in India and the world through conflict resolution, peace building, disarmament and development.

The IPCS mission is to develop an alternative and independent framework for peace and security through rigorous research and analysis, highlighting the possibility of arms reduction, weapons elimination, non-proliferation and peaceful termination of conflict. It disseminates this information through periodic briefings, publications, through conduct of seminars and appearing before the media.

The Institute fulfils this mission through conducting independent research on conventional and non-conventional security issues and by sharing its findings with policy makers, the strategic community and members of the civil society. It provides a forum for discussion and explores alternatives. It also provides a platform for government officials to discuss their agenda and policies with the strategic community and obtain their feedback. The IPCS roster of participants contains over 450 eminent members of the strategic community in Delhi.

The Institute regularly conducts training workshops, simulation game exercises for the National Defence University, other government officials, military officers and members of the strategic community.